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conditions （in the synthesis of phenomena； or of thought in general）
extends to the unconditioned is objectively true； or not； what
consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the
understanding； or rather whether there exists any such objectively
valid proposition of reason； and whether it is not； on the contrary； a
merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still
higher conditions； to approach pleteness in the series of them； and
thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of
reason。 We must ascertain； I say； whether this requirement of reason
has not been regarded； by a misunderstanding； as a transcendental
principle of pure reason； which postulates a thorough pleteness
in the series of conditions in objects themselves。 We must show；
moreover； the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
syllogisms； the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied… a
proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio
than of a postulatum… and that proceed from experience upwards to
its conditions。 The solution of these problems is our task in
transcendental dialectic； which we are about to expose even at its
source； that lies deep in human reason。 We shall divide it into two
parts； the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions
of pure reason； the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms。
BOOK I。
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON。
The conceptions of pure reason… we do not here speak of the
possibility of them… are not obtained by reflection； but by
inference or conclusion。 The conceptions of understanding are also
cogitated a priori antecedently to experience； and render it possible；
but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena；
in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical
consciousness。 Through them alone are cognition and the
determination of an object possible。 It is from them； accordingly；
that we receive material for reasoning； and antecedently to them we
possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be
deduced； On the other hand； the sole basis of their objective
reality consists in the necessity imposed on them； as containing the
intellectual form of all experience； of restricting their
application and influence to the sphere of experience。
But the term； conception of reason； or rational conception； itself
indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of
experience； because its object…matter is a cognition； of which every
empirical cognition is but a part… nay； the whole of possible
experience may be itself but a part of it… a cognition to which no
actual experience ever fully attains； although it does always
pertain to it。 The aim of rational conceptions is the prehension；
as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of
perceptions。 If they contain the unconditioned； they relate to that to
which all experience is subordinate； but which is never itself an
object of experience… that towards which reason tends in all its
conclusions from experience； and by the standard of which it estimates
the degree of their empirical use； but which is never itself an
element in an empirical synthesis。 If； notwithstanding； such
conceptions possess objective validity； they may be called conceptus
ratiocinati （conceptions legitimately concluded）； in cases where
they do not； they have been admitted on account of having the
appearance of being correctly concluded； and may be called conceptus
ratiocinantes （sophistical conceptions）。 But as this can only be
sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates
to the dialectical conclusions of reason； we shall omit any
consideration of it in this place。 As we called the pure conceptions
of the understanding categories； we shall also distinguish those of
pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas。 These
terms； however； we must in the first place explain and justify。
SECTION I … Of Ideas in General。
Despite the great wealth of words which European languages
possess； the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression
exactly suited to his conception； for want of which he is unable to
make himself intelligible either to others or to himself。 To coin
new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom
successful； and； before recourse is taken to so desperate an
expedient； it is advisable to examine the dead and learned
languages； with the hope and the probability that we may there meet
with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds。 In
this case； even if the original meaning of the word has bee
somewhat uncertain； from carelessness or want of caution on the part
of the authors of it； it is always better to adhere to and confirm its
proper meaning… even although it may be doubtful whether it was
formerly used in exactly this sense… than to make our labour vain by
want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible。
For this reason； when it happens that there exists only a single
word to express a certain conception； and this word； in its usual
acceptation； is thoroughly adequate to the conception； the accurate
distinction of which from related conceptions is of great
importance； we ought not to employ the expression improvidently； or；
for the sake of variety and elegance of style； use it as a synonym for
other cognate words。 It is our duty； on the contrary； carefully to
preserve its peculiar signification； as otherwise it easily happens
that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly
attracted to the expression； and it is lost amid the multitude of
other words of very different import； the thought which it conveyed；
and which it alone conveyed； is lost with it。
Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he
meant by it something which is never derived from the senses； but
which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding （with
which Aristotle occupied himself）； inasmuch as in experience nothing
perfectly correspondin