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reference only to things in the first sense。 We then see how it does
not involve any contradiction to assert； on the one hand； that the
will； in the phenomenal sphere… in visible action… is necessarily
obedient to the law of nature； and； in so far； not free； and； on the
other hand； that； as belonging to a thing in itself； it is not subject
to that law； and； accordingly； is free。 Now； it is true that I cannot；
by means of speculative reason； and still less by empirical
observation； cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently；
cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe
effects in the world of sense。 For； to do so； I must cognize this
being as existing； and yet not in time； which… since I cannot
support my conception by any intuition… is impossible。 At the same
time； while I cannot cognize； I can quite well think freedom； that
is to say； my representation of it involves at least no contradiction；
if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes of
representation （the sensible and the intellectual） and the
consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and
of the principles which flow from them。 Suppose now that morality
necessarily presupposed liberty； in the strictest sense； as a property
of our will； suppose that reason contained certain practical； original
principles a priori； which were absolutely impossible without this
presupposition； and suppose； at the same time； that speculative reason
had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all。 It
would then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the
speculative affirmation； the opposite of which involves an obvious
contradiction； and that liberty and； with it； morality must yield to
the mechanism of nature； for the negation of morality involves no
contradiction； except on the presupposition of liberty。 Now morality
does not require the speculative cognition of liberty； it is enough
that I can think it； that its conception involves no contradiction；
that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature。 But even this
requirement we could not satisfy； if we had not learnt the twofold
sense in which things may be taken； and it is only in this way that
the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined
within their proper limits。 For this result； then； we are indebted
to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard
to things in themselves； and establishes the necessary limitation of
our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena。
*In order to cognize an object； I must be able to prove its
possibility； either from its reality as attested by experience； or a
priori； by means of reason。 But I can think what I please； provided
only I do not contradict myself； that is； provided my conception is
a possible thought； though I may be unable to answer for the existence
of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities。 But something
more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective
validity； that is real possibility… the other possibility being merely
logical。 We are not； however； confined to theoretical sources of
cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement； but
may derive them from practical sources。
The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in
relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the
soul； admits of a similar exemplification； but on this point I shall
not dwell。 I cannot even make the assumption… as the practical
interests of morality require… of God； freedom； and immortality； if
I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent
insight。 For to arrive at these； it must make use of principles which；
in fact； extend only to the objects of possible experience； and
which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without
converting them into phenomena； and thus rendering the practical
extension of pure reason impossible。 I must； therefore； abolish
knowledge； to make room for belief。 The dogmatism of metaphysics； that
is； the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics
without previous criticism； is the true source of the unbelief （always
dogmatic） which militates against morality。
Thus； while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to
posterity； in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in
accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason； still the value of such a
bequest is not to be depreciated。 It will render an important
service to reason； by substituting the certainty of scientific
method for that random groping after results without the guidance of
principles； which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of
metaphysical studies。 It will render an important service to the
inquiring mind of youth； by leading the student to apply his powers to
the cultivation of。 genuine science； instead of wasting them； as at
present； on speculations which can never lead to any result； or on the
idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions。 But； above all； it will
confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion； by showing
that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by
the Socratic method； that is to say； by proving the ignorance of the
objector。 For； as the world has never been； and； no doubt； never
will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another； it
is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it
powerless for harm； by closing up the sources of error。
This important change in the field of the sciences； this loss of its
fancied possessions； to which speculative reason must submit； does not
prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity。 The
advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure
reason are not at all impaired。 The loss falls； in its whole extent；
on the monopoly of the schools； but does not in the slightest degree
touch the interests of mankind。 I appeal to the most obstinate
dogmatist； whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul
after death； derived from the simplicity of its substance； of the
freedom of t