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all this it results that action alone； as an empirical criterion； is a
sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality； without any
necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of
substance by a parison。 Besides； by this mode of induction we could
not attain to the pleteness which the magnitude and strict
universality of the conception requires。 For that the primary
subject of the causality of all arising and passing away； all origin
and extinction； cannot itself （in the sphere of phenomena） arise and
pass away； is a sound and safe conclusion； a conclusion which leads us
to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in
existence； and consequently to the conception of a substance as
phenomenon。
When something happens； the mere fact of the occurrence； without
regard to that which occurs； is an object requiring investigation。 The
transition from the non…being of a state into the existence of it；
supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed
in the phenomenon； is a fact of itself demanding inquiry。 Such an
event； as has been shown in No。 A； does not concern substance （for
substance does not thus originate）； but its condition or state。 It
is therefore only change； and not origin from nothing。 If this
origin be regarded as the effect of a foreign cause； it is termed
creation； which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena；
because the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of
experience。 If； however； I regard all things not as phenomena； but
as things in themselves and objects of understanding alone； they；
although substances； may be considered as dependent； in respect of
their existence； on a foreign cause。 But this would require a very
different meaning in the words； a meaning which could not apply to
phenomena as objects of possible experience。
How a thing can be changed； how it is possible that upon one state
existing in one point of time； an opposite state should follow in
another point of time… of this we have not the smallest conception a
priori。 There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers；
which can only be given empirically； for example； knowledge of
moving forces； or； in other words； of certain successive phenomena （as
movements） which indicate the presence of such forces。 But the form of
every change； the condition under which alone it can take place as the
ing into existence of another state （be the content of the
change； that is； the state which is changed； what it may）； and
consequently the succession of the states themselves can very well
be considered a priori； in relation to the law of causality and the
conditions of time。*
*It must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of certain
relations； but of the change of the state。 Thus； when a body moves
in a uniform manner； it does not change its state （of motion）； but
only when all motion increases or decreases。
When a substance passes from one state； a； into another state； b；
the point of time in which the latter exists is different from； and
subsequent to that in which the former existed。 In like manner； the
second state； as reality （in the phenomenon）； differs from the
first； in which the reality of the second did not exist； as b from
zero。 That is to say； if the state； b； differs from the state； a； only
in respect to quantity； the change is a ing into existence of b …
a； which in the former state did not exist； and in relation to which
that state is = O。
Now the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a；
into another state = b。 Between two moments there is always a
certain time； and between two states existing in these moments there
is always a difference having a certain quantity （for all parts of
phenomena are in their turn quantities）。 Consequently； every
transition from one state into another is always effected in a time
contained between two moments； of which the first determines the state
which leaves； and the second determines the state into the thing
passes。 the thing leaves； and the second determines the state into
which the thing Both moments； then； are limitations of the time of a
change； consequently of the intermediate state between both； and as
such they belong to the total of the change。 Now every change has a
cause； which evidences its causality in the whole time during which
the charge takes place。 The cause； therefore； does not produce the
change all at once or in one moment； but in a time； so that； as the
time gradually increases from the mencing instant； a； to its
pletion at b； in like manner also； the quantity of the reality
（b … a） is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained
between the first and last。 All change is therefore possible only
through a continuous action of the causality； which； in so far as it
is uniform； we call a momentum。 The change does not consist of these
momenta； but is generated or produced by them as their effect。
Such is the law of the continuity of all change； the ground of which
is that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of
parts which are the smallest possible； but that； notwithstanding；
the state of a thing passes in the process of a change through all
these parts； as elements； to its second state。 There is no smallest
degree of reality in a phenomenon； just as there is no smallest degree
in the quantity of time； and so the new state of reality grows up
out of the former state； through all the infinite degrees thereof； the
differences of which one from another； taken all together； are less
than the difference between o and a。
It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this
principle in the investigation of nature。 But how such a
proposition； which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of
nature； is possible pletely a priori； is indeed a question which
deserves investigation； although the first view seems to demonstrate
the truth and reality of the principle； and the question； how it is
possible； may be considered superfluous。 For there are so many
groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure
reason that we must take it as a