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the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science；
and within the sphere of pure ideas。
What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in
the present case to menace the best interests of humanity？ The
course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain
and natural one。 Let each thinker pursue his own path； if he shows
talent； if be gives evidence of profound thought； in one word； if he
shows that he possesses the power of reasoning… reason is always the
gainer。 If you have recourse to other means； if you attempt to
coerce reason； if you raise the cry of treason to humanity； if you
excite the feelings of the crowd； which can neither understand nor
sympathize with such subtle speculations… you will only make
yourselves ridiculous。 For the question does not concern the advantage
or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries； the
question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of
speculation； apart from all kinds of interest； and whether we may
depend upon the exertions of speculative reason； or must renounce
all reliance on it。 Instead of joining the batants； it is your part
to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle… a laborious struggle for
the parties engaged； but attended； in its progress as well as in its
result； with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of
thought and knowledge。 It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by
Reason； and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the
question she must adopt。 Moreover； reason is sufficiently held in
check by its own power； the limits imposed on it by its own nature are
sufficient； it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional
guards； as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the
intellectual state。 In the dialectic of reason there is no victory
gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility。
The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason； and we cannot
but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect
freedom which ought to be its essential condition。 In this case； we
should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism；
which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes； by exposing
the illusions and prejudices in which they originated。
There is in human nature an unworthy propensity… a propensity which；
like everything that springs from nature； must in its final purpose be
conducive to the good of humanity… to conceal our real sentiments； and
to give expression only to certain received opinions； which are
regarded as at once safe and promotive of the mon good。 It is true；
this tendency； not only to conceal our real sentiments； but to profess
those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society； has not only
civilized； but； in a certain measure； moralized us； as no one can
break through the outward covering of respectability； honour； and
morality； and thus the seemingly…good examples which we which we see
around us form an excellent school for moral improvement； so long as
our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken。 But this disposition
to represent ourselves as better than we are； and to utter opinions
which are not our own； can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary
arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized
state； and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and
manner of the good we see。 But when true principles have been
developed； and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of
thought； this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour；
otherwise it corrupts the heart； and checks the growth of good
dispositions with the mischievous weed of air appearances。
I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and
hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion； where there is less
temptation to restrain the free expression of thought。 For what can be
more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify
our real sentiments； to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard
to our statements； or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof
which we well know to be insufficient？ So long as mere personal vanity
is the source of these unworthy artifices… and this is generally the
case in speculative discussions； which are mostly destitute of
practical interest； and are incapable of plete demonstration… the
vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side；
and thus the result is the same； although it is not brought about so
soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright
spirit。 But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of
certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very
foundations of public welfare and morality… it seems not only prudent；
but even praise worthy； to maintain the good cause by illusory
arguments； rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage
of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely
practical conviction； and of pelling us to confess our inability to
attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects。 But we ought
to reflect that there is nothing； in the world more fatal to the
maintenance of a good cause than deceit； misrepresentation； and
falsehood。 That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in
the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least
requirement that can be made。 If we could reckon with security even
upon so little； the conflict of speculative reason regarding the
important questions of God； immortality； and freedom； would have
been either decided long ago； or would very soon be brought to a
conclusion。 But； in general； the uprightness of the defence stands
in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause； and perhaps more
honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who
uphold these doctrines。
I shall persuade myself； then； that I have readers who do not wish
to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments。 Such will now
recognize the fact that； according to the principles of this Critique；
if we consider not what is； but what ought to be the case； there