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existence； which is preceded by a period in which nothing exists）；
an existence which presupposes no other condition than that of time；
and； instead of limits of extension； boundaries of the universe。 But
the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon； and its quantity；
and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of
sensibility； without doing away with the essential reality of this
world itself。 The world of sense； if it is limited； must necessarily
lie in the infinite void。 If this； and with it space as the a priori
condition of the possibility of phenomena； is left out of view； the
whole world of sense disappears。 In our problem is this alone
considered as given。 The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the
general conception of a world； in which abstraction has been made of
all conditions of intuition； and in relation to which no synthetical
proposition… either affirmative or negative… is possible。
SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS。
THESIS。
Every posite substance in the world consists of simple parts； and
there exists nothing that is not either itself simple； or posed
of simple parts。
PROOF。
For； grant that posite substances do not consist of simple parts；
in this case； if all bination or position were annihilated in
thought； no posite part； and （as； by the supposition； there do
not exist simple parts） no simple part would exist。 Consequently； no
substance； consequently； nothing would exist。 Either； then； it is
impossible to annihilate position in thought； or； after such
annihilation； there must remain something that subsists without
position； that is； something that is simple。 But in the former case
the posite could not itself consist of substances； because with
substances position is merely a contingent relation； apart from
which they must still exist as self…subsistent beings。 Now； as this
case contradicts the supposition； the second must contain the truth…
that the substantial posite in the world consists of simple parts。
It follows； as an immediate inference； that the things in the
world are all； without exception； simple beings… that position is
merely an external condition pertaining to them… and that； although we
never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the
state of position； reason must cogitate these as the primary
subjects of all position； and consequently； as prior thereto… and
as simple substances。
ANTITHESIS。
No posite thing in the world consists of simple parts； and
there does not exist in the world any simple substance。
PROOF。
Let it be supposed that a posite thing （as substance） consists of
simple parts。 Inasmuch as all external relation； consequently all
position of substances； is possible only in space； the space；
occupied by that which is posite； must consist of the same number
of parts as is contained in the posite。 But space does not
consist of simple parts； but of spaces。 Therefore； every part of the
posite must occupy a space。 But the absolutely primary parts of
what is posite are simple。 It follows that what is simple
occupies a space。 Now； as everything real that occupies a space；
contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other； and
is consequently posite… and a real posite； not of accidents （for
these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance）； but
of substances… it follows that the simple must be a substantial
posite； which is self…contradictory。
The second proposition of the antithesis… that there exists in the
world nothing that is simple… is here equivalent to the following： The
existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any
experience or perception either external or internal； and the
absolutely simple is a mere idea； the objective reality of which
cannot be demonstrated in any possible experience； it is consequently；
in the exposition of phenomena； without application and object。 For；
let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience
for this transcendental idea； the empirical intuition of such an
object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold
with its parts external to each other； and connected into unity。
Now； as we cannot reason from the non…consciousness of such a manifold
to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object；
and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the
establishment and proof of absolute simplicity； it follows that this
simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever。 As；
therefore； an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any
experience； and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total
of all possible experiences： nothing simple exists in the world。
This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim
than the first。 The first merely banishes the simple from the
intuition of the posite； while the second drives it entirely out of
nature。 Hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception
of a given object of external intuition （of the posite）； but we
were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a
possible experience in general。
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY。
THESIS。
When I speak of a whole； which necessarily consists of simple parts；
I understand thereby only a substantial whole； as the true
posite； that is to say； I understand that contingent unity of the
manifold which is given as perfectly isolated （at least in thought）；
placed in reciprocal connection； and thus constituted a unity。 Space
ought not to be called a positum but a totum； for its parts are
possible in the whole； and not the whole by means of the parts。 It
might perhaps be called a positum ideale； but not a positum
reale。 But this is of no importance。 As space is not a posite of
substances （and not even of real accidents）； if I abstract all
position therein… nothing； not even a point； remains； for a point
is possible only as the limit of a space… consequently of a posite。
Space and time； ther