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which is represented in the following syllogism：
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject； does not
exist otherwise than as subject； and is therefore substance。
A thinking being； considered merely as such； cannot be cogitated
otherwise than as subject。
Therefore it exists also as such； that is； as substance。
In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and
in every relation； consequently as it may be given in intuition。 But
in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards
itself as subject； relatively to thought and the unity of
consciousness； but not in relation to intuition； by which it is
presented as an object to thought。 Thus the conclusion is here arrived
at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis。*
*Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different
senses。 In the major it is considered as relating and applying to
objects in general； consequently to objects of intuition also。 In
the minor； we understand it as relating merely to
self…consciousness。 In this sense； we do not cogitate an object； but
merely the relation to the self…consciousness of the subject； as the
form of thought。 In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot
be cogitated otherwise than as subjects。 In the second； we do not
speak of things； but of thought all objects being abstracted）； in
which the Ego is always the subject of consciousness。 Hence the
conclusion cannot be； 〃I cannot exist otherwise than as subject〃；
but only 〃I can； in cogitating my existence； employ my Ego only as the
subject of the judgement。〃 But this is an identical proposition； and
throws no light on the mode of my existence。
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism； will be plain to any
one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition
of the principles of the pure understanding； and the section on
noumena。 For it was there proved that the conception of a thing； which
can exist per se… only as a subject and never as a predicate；
possesses no objective reality； that is to say； we can never know
whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception；
consequently； the conception is nothing more than a conception； and
from it we derive no proper knowledge。 If this conception is to
indicate by the term substance； an object that can be given； if it
is to bee a cognition； we must have at the foundation of the
cognition a permanent intuition； as the indispensable condition of its
objective reality。 For through intuition alone can an object be given。
But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent； for the Ego is
but the consciousness of my thought。 If then； we appeal merely to
thought； we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application
of the conception of substance… that is； of a subject existing per se…
to the subject as a thinking being。 And thus the conception of the
simple nature of substance； which is connected with the objective
reality of this conception； is shown to be also invalid； and to be； in
fact； nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of
self…consciousness in thought； whilst we remain perfectly ignorant
whether the subject is posite or not。
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the
Substantiality or Permanence of the Soul。
This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the
mon argument which attempts to prove that the soul… it being
granted that it is a simple being… cannot perish by dissolution or
deposition； he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by
extinction； or disappearance。 He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo；
that the soul cannot be annihilated； by showing that a simple being
cannot cease to exist。 Inasmuch as； be said； a simple existence cannot
diminish； nor gradually lose portions of its being； and thus be by
degrees reduced to nothing （for it possesses no parts； and therefore
no multiplicity）； between the moment in which it is； and the moment in
which it is not； no time can be discovered… which is impossible。 But
this philosopher did not consider that； granting the soul to possess
this simple nature； which contains no parts external to each other and
consequently no extensive quantity； we cannot refuse to it any less
than to any other being； intensive quantity； that is； a degree of
reality in regard to all its faculties； nay； to all that constitutes
its existence。 But this degree of reality can bee less and less
through an infinite series of smaller degrees。 It follows；
therefore； that this supposed substance… this thing； the permanence of
which is not assured in any other way； may； if not by deposition；
by gradual loss （remissio） of its powers （consequently by
elanguescence； if I may employ this expression）； be changed into
nothing。 For consciousness itself has always a degree； which may be
lessened。* Consequently the faculty of being conscious may be
diminished； and so with all other faculties。 The permanence of the
soul； therefore； as an object of the internal sense； remains
undemonstrated； nay； even indemonstrable。 Its permanence in life is
evident； per se； inasmuch as the thinking being （as man） is to itself；
at the same time； an object of the external senses。 But this does
not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm； from mere
conceptions； its permanence beyond life。*＇2＇
*Clearness is not； as logicians maintain； the consciousness of a
representation。 For a certain degree of consciousness； which may
not； however； be sufficient for recollection； is to be met with in
many dim representations。 For without any consciousness at all； we
should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure
representations we connect； as we really can do with many conceptions；
such as those of right and justice； and those of the musician； who
strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music。 But a
representation is clear； in which our consciousness is sufficient
for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from
others。 If we are only conscious that there is a difference； but are
not conscious of the difference… that is； what the difference is