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the predicaments of pure psychology； but we shall； for brevity's sake；
allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection。
Before entering on this task； however； the following general
remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument。
It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object； but
only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity
of consciousness in which all thinking consists。 It follows that I
cognize myself； not through my being conscious of myself as
thinking； but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as
determined in relation to the function of thought。 All the modi of
self…consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects
（conceptions of the understanding… categories）； they are mere
logical functions； which do not present to thought an object to be
cognized； and cannot therefore present my Self as an object。 Not the
consciousness of the determining； but only that of the determinable
self； that is； of my internal intuition （in so far as the manifold
contained in it can be connected conformably with the general
condition of the unity of apperception in thought）； is the object。
1。 In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation
which constitutes a judgement。 But that the I which thinks； must be
considered as in thought always a subject； and as a thing which cannot
be a predicate to thought； is an apodeictic and identical proposition。
But this proposition does not signify that I； as an object； am； for
myself； a self…subsistent being or substance。 This latter statement…
an ambitious one… requires to be supported by data which are not to be
discovered in thought； and are perhaps （in so far as I consider the
thinking self merely as such） not to be discovered in the thinking
self at all。
2。 That the I or Ego of apperception； and consequently in all
thought； is singular or simple； an；3 cannot be resolved into a
plurality of subjects； and therefore indicates a logically simple
subject… this is self…evident from the very conception of an Ego；
and is consequently an analytical proposition。 But this is not
tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance…
for this would be a synthetical proposition。 The conception of
substance always relates to intuitions； which with me cannot be
other than sensuous； and which consequently lie pletely out of
the sphere of the understanding and its thought： but to this sphere
belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought。 It would
indeed be surprising； if the conception of 〃substance；〃 which in other
cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements
presented by intuition… so much trouble； too； to discover whether it
can be simple （as in the case of the parts of matter）… should be
presented immediately to me； as if by revelation； in the poorest
mental representation of all。
3。 The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the
manifold representations of which I am conscious； is likewise a
proposition lying in the conceptions themselves； and is consequently
analytical。 But this identity of the subject； of which I am
conscious in all its representations； does not relate to or concern
the intuition of the subject； by which it is given as an object。
This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the
person； by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of
its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of
circumstances。 To prove this； we should require not a mere analysis of
the proposition； but synthetical judgements based upon a given
intuition。
4。 I distinguish my own existence； as that of a thinking being； from
that of other things external to me… among which my body also is
reckoned。 This is also an analytical proposition； for other things are
exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself。
But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things
external to me； and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking
being （without being man）… cannot be known or inferred from this
proposition。
Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
object； by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought。
The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a
metaphysical determination of the object。
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous； if there
existed a possibility of proving a priori； that all thinking beings
are in themselves simple substances； as such； therefore； possess the
inseparable attribute of personality； and are conscious of their
existence apart from and unconnected with matter。 For we should thus
have taken a step beyond the world of sense； and have penetrated
into the sphere of noumena； and in this case the right could not be
denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere； of establishing
ourselves； and； under a favouring star； appropriating to ourselves
possessions in it。 For the proposition： 〃Every thinking being； as
such； is simple substance；〃 is an a priori synthetical proposition；
because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is
the subject of it； and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the
mode of its existence； and in the second place annexes a predicate
（that of simplicity） to the latter conception… a predicate which it
could not have discovered in the sphere of experience。 It would follow
that a priori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate；
not only； as we have maintained； in relation to objects of possible
experience； and as principles of the possibility of this experience
itself； but are applicable to things in themselves… an inference which
makes an end of the whole of this Critique； and obliges us to fall
back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure。 But indeed the
danger is not so great； if we look a little closer into the question。
There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism；
which is represented in the following syllogism：
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject； does not
exist otherwi